analogical reasoning under the rules of statutory analogy, a judicial conclusion is drawn from
the case that has already been classified (normatively identified) and assessed on another case
based on similarities. Therefore, legal norms are applied to the situations that are not direct
subjects to the relevant classification (Macagno, 2009). In Russia, the application of civil law
by means of analogia legis is directly permitted for civil disputes (Civil Code of RF). If such a
legal gap was identified, and it is impossible to apply the analogy of law to overcome it, Section
2 of Article 6 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation provides a mechanism of the legal
analogy—analogia iuris, i.e., the determination of the rights and obligations of the participants
in a disputed relationship based on the general principles and meaning of civil law, as well as
the requirements of good faith, reasonableness, and justice.
According to juristic theory, legal analogy is established not according to specific
norms, but according to the so-called “general principle of law” (Damele, 2014), which is
regarded as “more mysterious and puzzling than analogia legis”, as it is associated with
axiology and the necessity to ensure internal consistency of the legal system (Koszowski, 2017).
Therefore, the analogy of law can be an instrumental for the prompt perfection of the law, and
can serve as “something more” than the logical device used by the court (Tsikhotsky, 2011). In
addition, the analogy of law effectiveness in exercise the subjective potential of the law enforcer
(personal experience and worldview) contributes to the resolution of the most difficult legal
situations (Shindyapina and Boshno, 2006), ensuring the spirit of law (Anisimov, 2016) and the
implementation of the real—immediate, direct—functioning of the basic principles and the
meaning of legislation (Kuznetsova, 2006).
The implementation of the mechanism of the analogy of law in making legal decisions
contributes to a serious discretion of the executor, which sometimes qualifies analogical
reasoning as “a mask for unrecognized judicial lawmaking” (Schauer and Spellman, 2017).
Therefore, there is a certain amount of uncertainty in the mechanism of legal impact. Since the
tendency to increase the uncertainty in the law is “extreme” (D'Amato, 2010), it is logical to
assume that the role of analogia iuris in legal regulation should increase.
In the doctrine, the analogy of law is mostly regarded as “spare”, “the worst” (Rovny,
2011) and “exceptional” instrument, used when all other means have been exhausted (Balashov
and Mishutina, 2009), which is below the last stage in the hierarchy of permissible civil legal
regulations (Braginsky and Vitryansky, 2001). Some authors approved the practice of
overcoming legal gaps by means of the analogy of specific rules of the law. However, they
pointed out the impossibility or at least undesirability of the implementation of the analogy of
law, since the latter is less consistent with the requirements of legality consolidation, and creates
the basis for abuse while using discretionary capabilities of the officials that is inevitable in
terms of the analogy of law application (Szabo, 1964).
Revista de Investigación Apuntes Universitarios
ISSN 2312-4253(impresa)
ISSN 2078-4015(en línea)